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HomeMy WebLinkAboutAGENDA REPORT 1987 1123 CC ADJ ITEM 11IITEM LAW OFFICES BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN ONE WILSHIRE BUILDING MARTIN J. BURKE* MICHELE R. VADON 624 SOUTH GRAND AVENUE, IITN FLOOR VENTURA COUNTY OFFICE GEORGE W. TACKABURY' B. DEREK STRAATSMA LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017 950 COUNTY SQUARE DRIVE JAMES T. BRADSHAW, JR* SCOTT F. FIELD SUITE 207 MARK C. ALLEN, JR- BENJAMIN S. KAUFMAN (213) 623-1900 VENTURA, CALIFORNIA 93003 MARTIN L. BURKE' MICHAEL J. LONG (805) 644-7480 CARL K. NEWTON* GREGORY A. DOCIMO J. ROBERT FLANDRICK" KEVIN S. MILLS TELECOPIER: (213) 623-8297 NORMAN E. GAARt DEBORAH J. FOX ORANGE COUNTY OFFICE EDWARD M. FOX* LISA E. KRANITZ 3200 PARK CENTER DRIVE DENNIS P. BURKE' MARGARET A. SOHAGI HARRY C. WILLIAMS SUITE 650 LELAND C. DOLLEY° SLADE J. NEIGHBORS (1912-1967) COSTA MESA, CALIFORNIA 92626 COLIN LENNARD* DAVID A. KETTEL (714) 545-5559 THOMAS J. FEELEY* KIM E. McNALLY ROYAL M. SOR ENSEN NEIL F. YEAGER* STEVEN A. DROWN (1914 1983) BRIAN A. PIERIK° JACK R. LENACK N PLAZA 7300 COLLEGE BOULEVARD KATHERINE E. STONE* ROBERT J. TRACHTENBERG CHARLES M. CALDERON* DENNIS I. FLOYD SUITE ANSAS 66210 OVERLAND PARK, K PETER M. THORSON* M. LOIS BOBAK (913) 339-6200 JERRY M. PATTERSON DEENA C. LEIBOWITZ HAROLD A. BRIDGES° BENJAMIN Y. KIM CHERYL J. KANE* CECILIA M. QUICK RAYMOND J. FUENTES' FELICIA J. NELSON November 5 1987 OF COUNSEL THOMAS H. DOWNEY ROBERT V. WADDEN / DWIGHT A. NEWELL DON G. KIRCHER CHRISTOPHER J. THOMAS VIRGINIA R. PESOLA MICHAEL R. WOODS S. PAUL BRUGUERA 'PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION to PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION ADMITTED KANSAS 6 MISSOURI The Honorable Mayor Clint Harper and Members of the City Council City of Moorpark 799 Moorpark Avenue Moorpark, California 93021 Re: Councilmanic Districts Dear Mayor Harper and Councilmembers: This letter is in response to your request for information on councilmanic districts. Attached is an outline of the process that cities must follow to convert from elections at large to councilmanic district elections. Also attached is an article on the pros and cons of utiliz- ing councilmanic districts together with a summary of the article. Assembly Bill No. 2190, introduced by Assemblyman Peter R. Chacon on March 6th of this year, would require that every city with a population of 25,000 or more be governed by a city council comprised of members representing single -member districts, with one council member who resides in each district to be elected by the voters of that district. The bill was submitted to the Assembly Ways and Means Committee on May 5, 1987. The Committee has until January 30, 1988 to bring the bill to the floor of the Assembly, or the bill will die in the Committee. Attached is the latest version of A.B. 2190. NOV 9 1987 CITY OF MOORPAO The Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council City of Moorpark November 5, 1987 - Page 2 If you have any questions or comments regarding the above matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. CJK/MLG:1r cjk/LTR3561 Enclosures Very truly -,yours, CHE YL J KANE CITY ORNEY, MOORPARK; and BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN MOORPARK, CALIFORNIA City Council Me -,ring of //- 3-198.7 ACTIOi *-) i -) -) A,7-7 By MOORPARK, CALIFORNIA City Cou' Cil t:-�F--^ling I ACT1O 'q- ►I mag/BIL4261 COUNCILMANIC DISTRICT PROCESS (Government Code §§34870, et seq.) I. Definitions A. "By districts" means election from among candidates who are residents of the district by voters in the district alone. B. "From districts" means election from among candidates who are residents of the district by voters in the entire city. II. Submission of Ordinance to Electors A. At a municipal or special election, the city council may submit to the voters an ordinance providing for the election of couny�lmembers by or from five, seven or nine districts— . B. The ordinance may also be qualified for the ballot by means of an initiative measure. C. The ordinance must be approved by a majority of those voting in the election. III. Content of Ordinance. A. State the number of districts. B. Describe boundaries of each district. C. Number each district. D. State whether members of city council shall be elected by districts or from districts. E. State the term of office of each member, if other than four years. 1/ If there are to be four, six or eight districts, the ordinance must also provide for the at -large election of a mayor. mag/BIL4261 F. State procedures for the transition between the at larr elections and the district elections. - IV. Repeal or Amendment of Ordinance. A. Manner - In the same manner as the ordinance was originally enacted, provided that the term of office of any councilmember elected may not be affected. B. Altering district boundaries - The proposal must first be submitted to the planning commission for its review and recommendation. 2/ The state statute does not provide for this transitory period between the at large and the district elections. The alternatives for transition include: (1) Having the term of office of each council member begin and end at the same time so that all of the districts would elect their councilmembers at the same municipal elections; and (2) Having the term of office of councilmembers staggered so that not more than a simple majority of the districts would elect their councilmembers at any municipal election. To implement this alternative a minority of councilmembers would be elected to a half term in the first district election. -2- AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY APRIL 30, 1987 AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY APRIL 20, 1987 ® CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1987-88 REGULAR SESSION ASSEMBLY BILL No. 2190 40 Introduced by Assembly Members Chacon, Bronzan, Willie Brown, Calderon, Campbell, Hannigan, Isenberg, Klehs, Polanco, Roos, and Maxine Waters (Coauthor: Senator Bill Greene) March 6, 1987 An act to add Section 22809 to the Elections Code, relating to elections. ® LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST AB 2190, as amended, Chacon. City council elections. Existing law provides that a city may have alternative forms of government, including government by city manager, and a city council with an elective mayor. It provides that city • council elections may be by districts or from districts, as defined, or by districts and from districts with an elective mayor. This bill would impose a state -mandated local program by requiring that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, every city with a population Of25,000 or more be governed by a city council comprised of members representing ®single -member districts, with one council member who resides in each district to be elected by voters of that district. It would provide that no council member shall be elected in an at -large election or from a multimember district. This bill would provide that its provisions shall not prohibit a city from electing a mayor or a city manager to govern the city in addition to the city council. 97 40 AB 2190 —2— The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse • local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish -procedures for malting that reimbursement, including the creation of a State Mandates Claims Fund to pay the costs of mandates which do not exceed $500,000 statewide and other procedures for claims whose statewide costs exceed $500,000. This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to those statutory procedures and, if the statewide cost does not exceed $500,000, shall be made from the State Mandates Claims Fund. Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes. State -mandated local program: yes. The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 1 SECTION 1. Section 22809 is added to the Elections 2 Code, to read: 3 22809. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of 4 law, every city with a population of 25,000 or more shall 5 be governed by a city council comprised of council 6 members representing single -member districts, with one 7 council member who resides in each district to be elected 8 by the voters of that district. No city council member • 9 shall be elected in an at -large election or from a 10 multimember district. 11 (b) This section shall not prohibit a city from electing 12 a mayor or a city manager to govern the city in addition 13 to the city council. 14 SEC. 2. Notwithstanding Section 17610 of the 15 Government Code, if the Commission on State Mandates 16 determines that this act contains costs mandated by the 17 state, reimbursement to local agencies and school 18 districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 19 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 20 2 of the Government Code. If the statewide cost of the 21 claim for reimbursement does not exceed five hundred 22 thousand dollars ($500,000), reimbursement shall be 97 60 ate to reimburse costs mandated procedures for •cation of a State ndates which do procedures for 0. nission on State >sts mandated by shall be made if the statewide from the State committee: yes. <-iot as follows. to the Elections ler provision of 00 or more shall •ised of council stricts, with one •ict to be elected ,ouncil member ion or from a ty from electing city in addition 17610 of the State Mandates iandated by the ies and school rsuant to Part 7 vision 4 of Title wide cost of the A five hundred 3ment shall be r U —3- 1 made from the State Mandates Claims Fund. ❑f AB 2190 97 60 1 97 60 cjk/SUM2583 Summary of "Should City Councils Be Elected By District?" Western City, March 1987 Pro by Grofman 1. Geographically concentrated minorities may be able to elect candidates of choice in one or more districts. 2. Comprehensive neighborhood - based representation is provid- ed to all of the city's repre- sentatives. Con by McDermott 1. Regionalism and special interest, "pork barrel" poli- tics, may be promoted. 2. The drawing of district boundaries can lead to "packing", "cracking" or gerrymandering. 3. A way is provided to encom- 3. The electoral structure pass and integrate a diverse is overblown because the population mix into the politi- delivery of city services is cal life of the city. more a function of bureau- cratic efficiencies than councilmanic demands. 4. Costs of organizing a dis- trict campaign are generally much less than for a city-wide campaign. 5. Legitimate policy concerns which represent the full range of views within the community are expressed and represented. 4. Community organization, not district elections, is what ensures consideration of neighborhood input. 5. Shifting demography and citizenship affect election outcomes far more than elec- toral structure. LEAGUE OF- �-dss.2Y1 RETURN IFd 2 WE,+„,.� r r: Giti:C.t��=� �. C q Fcl..a..y ai-.a.s.,i ,-.,,,.,.., - ------ ---- increasing challenge on legal, philosophical, and practical grounds. As a consequence of law- suits, or threatened lawsuits, brought under the 14th Amendment or under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended in 1982, scores of cities and counties throughout the country have ended their use of at -large elections. The funda- mental problem is that at -large elections tend to submerge racial, linguistic and political minori- ties as compared to single -member district elec- tions within which geographically concentrated minorities may be able to elect candidates of choice from one or more districts." The sub- mergence of racial or ethnic minority voting strength is virtually guaranteed, if voting in the at -large contests is polarized along racial or ethnic lines (Grofman, Migalski and Noviello, 1985).3 (continued on page 24) A ,March 19871Western City District Elections? Pro (continued from page 4) In the leading case interpreting the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, Thornburg v. Gingles, 196 S. Ct 2752, a successful challenge to multi- member district legislative elections in eight North Carolina Counties, the U.S. Supreme Court held the key issue is whether bloc voting by the majority group usually defeats the candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geo- graphically insular minority group.'The court noted (106 S. Ct. at 2766-67) that the resolution of this issue requires the presence of three factual predicates: First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is suffi- ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single -member district .. . Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive .. . Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white ma- jority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it — in the absence of special circumstances ... usually to defeat the minority preferred candidate. Note that the Thornburg test does not require that cities with at -large elections be shown to have engaged in intentional discrimination. All that is required is that the election method is found to give rise to a situation in which minorities lack an equal opportunity to elect can- didates of choice.' Note also that Thorn- burg treats as irrelevant the questions of why voting is racially polarized; all that matters is that voting is racially polar- ized, i.e., that whites and minorities often vote differently vis-a-vis minority (or minority -supported) candidates. Most cities in California make use of at -large elections. Many California cities have substan- tial minority populations, and the num- ber of cities with a substantial minority population will increase as the overall minority population in the state contin- ues to rise over the next two decades. The lack of success of Hispanic, black and Asian candidates (as well as of other candidates of choice of these minorities communities) in many California cities suggests these cities will find their at - large elections struck down by federal courts as being in violation of the Voting Rights Act under the test set forth in Thornburg. While the City of Pomona recently was able to defend itself against a Section 2 Voting Rights Act challenge, special circumstances in that case are unlikely to be found elsewhere (also, the Pomona decision is likely to be appealed). In California, the case to watch is the appellate decision in Gomez v. City of Watsonville, the trial for which ended in January of this year with a decision for defendants. In that case the federal dis- trict court found all three elements of the Thornburg factors to be satisfied. How- ever, the court was concerned there was no evidence of non -responsiveness to minority concerns and felt a single - member district plan was not needed be- cause of low levels of minority turnout and the dispersal of the minority popu- lation outside the core Hispanic area. If the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund attorneys prevail in their appeal of the decision in this case, as I expect they will (because the lower court did find all three Thornburg elements to be present), Gomez v. Wat- sonville almost certainly will be but the first of a series of lawsuits against other California cities. Given the straightforward nature of the three -fold Thornburg test, California cities should be able to ascertain, at min- imum cost, the likelihood that they will be able to successfully defend a Section 2 lawsuit. Cities defending against such law suits are in a doubly awkward posi- tion. If they choose to fight the suit, the legal costs will be very high and, if they lose, they may have little or no say in how the single -member districting plan remedy is drawn. Thus, if the case facts are clear, an out -of -court settlement clearly should be preferable to most cities. It is minority vote dilution which makes the use of at -large elections es- pecially pernicious. A legal battle over at -large elections, will place elected of- ficials under severe personal pressure to justify the purity of their motivations (even though motivations are irrelevant (Bernard Grofman is Professor of Po- litical Science at the University of Cali- fornia, Irvine. He has served as an expert witness or court -appointed con- sultant in many of the most important reapportionment and voting rights cases of this decade, including the 1986 U.S. Supreme Court cases, Thornburg v. tin- gles and Davis v. Bandemer. Most re- cently he was an expert witness for the minority plaintiffs in Gomez v. City of Watsonville.) to a judicial determination of a Section 2 violation), community relations will be strained, the city will get unfavorable publicity, and the city will waste a great deal of money, perhaps hundreds of thousands of dollars that could certainly be better spent in other ways. In one case, a city spent tens of thousands of dollars on four expert witnesses, only to find three of them had so little useful to say that the City chose not to call them at trial. Moreover, when the case facts are clear, a city certainly will lose, and the city may then have little say in de- signing a remedy plan. Most important, however, given the need to provide fair and effective rep- resentation to all elements of the com- munity, it is very hard to morally justify fighting to maintain an at -large election system which dilutes or submerges mi- nority voting strength. In cities where there is minority vote dilution the legal, moral and practical arguments for elim- inating at -large elections and replacing them with a fairer form of representation are clear and compelling. Cities which fail to do so eventually will be forced to make the change anyway. . However, even absent the condi- tions under which a Section 2 Voting Rights Act Violation can be proved, there are other reasons a single -member -district scheme may be preferable to an at -large election system. In particular. (1) Single -member districts provide comprehensive neighborhood -based representation to all of the city's resi- dents. Under Watsonville's at -large elec- tion method, in contrast, almost all of the incumbents lived in one census tract — many within a few blocks of each other. This relatively affluent census tract contained only about 20 percent of the city's total population, but furnished most of its council members. (2) Single -member districts provide a way to encompass and integrate a diverse population mix into the political life of the city. Groups which see little or no chance of affecting outcomes of a city- wide election may become dispirited. For such groups incentives to participate in the political process under an at -large scheme are minimal. Moreover, resent- ment at exclusion can grow. In contrast, single -member districts facilitate partic- ipation in the political process by all groups. In general, costs of organizing a local campaign are much less than for a city-wide campaign. Door-to-door campaigning by volunteers can substi- tute for media use for candidates whose Xf March 19871Western Citv financial resources are limited but who do have a substantial base of local com- munity support. (3) Legitimate policy concerns may go unexpressed and unrepresented, if the city council reflects only a relatively homogeneous majority bloc of voters. Majority rule is desirable, but only if tempered with minority input so that de- liberations represent the full range of views within a community (Chamberlin and Courant, 1983). Opponents of single -member dis- tricts often use misleading ar- guments and misleading analogies to partisan ward -based elec- tions in East Coast cities at the turn of the century. At -large elections were in- stituted around the turn of the century in large part as a "reform" to forestall the evils seen in the domination of big city politics by political machines and their ethnic and immigrant constituents. Whatever the motives of the original "good -government" reformers who ad- vocated at -large elections coupled with non -partisan elections and a profes- sional city -manager as a means to ensure "efficient" government, their concerns and fears are almost totally irrelevant in the present context of California's non- partisan elections and generally well - governed and fiscally responsible cities. The government of a given California city before and after a shift from at -large to single -member districts will not be much different — only the number of groups effectively participating in the political process will change. Cities that have been well -governed will stay that way. Two other horrible scenarios are com- monly put forward to justify retention of an at -large election scheme. In one, after a shift to single -member districts, the city is hypothesized to be torn apart by the endless squabbling in the city council which replaces the previous "gentle- manly" style of dispute resolution. In the other, a politics of "spoils" is hy- pothesized to prevail in the new single - member district council — one in which council members cannot rise above par- ochial interests to look to the needs of the city as a whole. Neither of these con- cerns is well -substantiated by contem- porary empirical evidence. The level of conflict on the council may indeed initially rise as new groups are assimilated into the political pro- cess, but only if the community was deeply racially or ethnically split to be- gin with is discord apt to persist. In such instances, conflict within the council is simply a symptom of already present un- derlying racial tensions which may have been kept politically invisible by the dominance of one -bloc city politics under the previous at -large election scheme. For the good of the community, it is better, if such tensions exist, to re- solve them through the political process — rather than leave them to fester out of sight. However, the newly elected mi- nority representatives on the council will almost inevitably turn out to be people who will share with other councilmem- bers the practical concerns of running a city and being responsive to the diverse needs of its residents. As for the claim that district -based politics is inevitably "pork -barrel" pol- itics, certainly district -based represen- tatives are going to be closer to the issues and concerns of the neighborhoods they represent than are city council members elected at large; however, what is seen as parochialism from one perspective is simply grass -roots representation from another point of view. All politics in- volve give and take; all politics involve compromises between competing vi- sions of the good. All too often in coun- cils elected at large, one vision of the public interest prevails without debate —because competing minority views go unrepresented. Also, while it is often claimed that at - large elections attract "better" candi- dates than do single -member district elections, the term "better" is somewhat suspect as a code word. Certainly, whites who are elected may be more po- litically experienced than their black or Hispanic opponents, but this in large part is simply a reflection of previous minority exclusion from the political process. Moreover, the very limited available evidence from political science research is that socioeconomically sim- ilar sorts of candidates are elected under both election types.' One of the most commonly heard ar- guments against using a single -member district plan in which geographically concentrated populations are neither fragmented nor submerged is that the "majority -minority" districts created under such a plan are, themselves, a new form of "political segregation." This argument was explicitly rejected by the three -judge panel in Gingles v. Edmisten 509 F. Supp. 395 at 374 (1984). This argument misses a central point: Unless _ voting were polarized, there would be no need to create single -member dis- tricts, since, without polarized voting, the population would appear to be suf- ficiently homogeneous in voting pat- terns that choice of election system was not a matter of great moment. But, when voting is (racially) polarized, and the majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to give minority -supported candi- dates little chance to win elections, the issue is not whether to replace some non- existent idyllic racial harmony with "segregated" districts but, rather, whether to end a situation in which a minority group has been denied an equal opportunity to participate in the elec- toral process. While a "color-blind" so- ciety is an ideal to be sought, in many American cities race -conscious and eth= nic-conscious voting are realities whose consequences must be faced. In my view, the surest route to a fully inte- grated society is one in which all groups have equal access to the political pro- cess; only when councils include minor- ity and minority -supported members can the political process of give and take work efficiently and fairly. When voting is racially polarized, minority voting strength is submerged or diluted, and minority electoral success consequently minimal, to talk of political integration or political coalition -building by the mi- nority group is a mockery. Three other arguments by opponents of single -member districting have re- cently surfaced and are worth a brief mention. The first is the legalistic argument that, if there is no evidence of nonres- ponsiveness by elected officials to mi- nority concerns, there can be no finding of racial vote dilution. As a political sci- entist, I find this argument misses sev- eral key points. Responsiiveness is a very hard concept to pin down; proving non - responsiveness can be quite difficult, as was recognized by the U.S. Senate Com- mittee on the Judiciary in its Report on the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act. That report downplayed the importance of proof of responsiveness. Almost always, elected officials will be able to adduce some evidence of legis- lation aimed to satisfy concerns of the minority community. Thus, requiring minorities to demonstrate nonrespon- siveness would impose a usually impos- sible burden. Moreover, in my view, evidence of some responsiveness by elected officials is essentially irrelevant to whether or not minority group mem- bers have an equal right to participate in the political process and to elect candi- dates of choice (cf. Thornburg v. Gingles 106 S. Ct. 2752 at 2788-2789 (1986)). (continued on page 28) Western CitylMarch 1987 25 . District Elections' Pro (continued from page 25) A second argument is the claim that the failure to include most or all minor- ity members in "majority -minority" districts somehow _disenfranchises mi- nority members who are not included. This I find a strange claim indeed. Cer- tainly, it is necessary to not fragment minority population concentration, but, of necessity, some minority members will be left out of the one or more majority -minority districts created (as happened in both Chicago and Los Angeles). These minority members are no more disenfranchised than they were under the at -large plan. More important, minority vote dilution is a violation of group rights. Necessarily, all members of a minority group must be presumed to benefit from any plan which ends sub- mergence of minority voting strength by creating districts in which that portion of the minority population which is geo- graphically concentrated can find an equal opportunity to elect candidates of choice. A third "misguided argument against the use of single -member districts is the claim that "if only the minority regis- tered and voted at higher levels," the problem of minority vote dilution would correct itself. Where voting is racially MANAGEMENT CONSULTING FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Arthur Young, with one of the largest government consulting practices in California, has a staff of specialized consultants dedicated to serving local government organizations. Our consultants are results -oriented, government services professionals, with extensive experience in all areas of municipal, county, and special district operations. Specific areas of expertise include: • Financial Analysis and Planning • Information Systems Evaluation, Design and Installation • Management Audits of Organizations and Procedures • Human Resources Studies, including Classification and Compensation Plans Fop more information on how we can help you, call any of our Government Consulting leaders: Nadine Levin Joe Hill San Francisco Sacramento (415) 951-3227 (916) 443-6756 Bob Tyre - Los Angeles (213) 977-3390 Larry Seigel Orange County 0►�r (714)850-9409 top C°osJ,t,� G vintt� G We take business personally. polarized and minority success in elect- ing candidates of choice minimal under an existing at -large system, the incen- tives to minority group members to reg- ister and vote are virtually nonexistent. Blaming minorities for low turnout is a classic example of "blaming the victim." Furthermore, as a matter of practical- ity, because of differences in voting age population and in citizen eligibility, in a city such as Watsonville, for example, (where slightly under 50 percent of the population but only 37 percent of the cit- izen population is of Spanish origin), even if eligible minority voters regis- tered and voted in the exact proportions as Anglos, an at -large election system still would dilute the voting strength of the city's Hispanic population. he single -member district system may not be the best possible election method for all times and all places, but where minority vote di- lution exists under the Thornburg test, a single -member district plan is an appro- priate remedy. At -large elections put mi- nority representation at the discretion of the majority. In polarized situations, this is likely to leave minorities com- pletely unrepresented. I believe the virtues of at -large elec- tions have been oversold. California cities that chose to adopt single -member districts would have little or no reason to regret such a choice. Certainly, it would be far better for at -large cities with sub- stantial minority populations to adopt single -member districts voluntarily and with full control of the redistricting pro- cess than to be forced to do so under federal court order after long, costly, highly publicized, and politically divi- sive legal proceedings. ■ I This proposition is strongly supported by numerous empirical studies carried out by polit- ical scientists and sociologists. See e.g.. Eng- strom and McDonald, 19W Davidson and Korbel, 1981; Grofman. 1982, and other essays in Grofman, et al.. 1982. A few studies purport to find little or no difference, on average, in mi- nority representation between cities with single - member districts and cities with multimember or at -large elections. but these suffer from a variety of severe methodological flaws (e.g., McManus, 1978. includes a large number of cities with vir- tually no black population. In such cities, of course, minority representation will be small or nonexistent under any election mechanism). Moreover, the best of the empirical studies, which use before and after comparisons, inevit- ably find a significant effect of election type (see e.g.. Grofman. Migalski, and Noviello, 1986). 2 Of course, there may be exceptions. For ex- ample, in Berkeley, minority representation was quite high under an at -large scheme. Indeed, in (continued on page 31) 28 March 19871Western City I he hot new political issue facing California cities is at -large versus district elections. Some claim that at -large voting makes it more difficult for candidates preferred by minor- ities to get elected. Minority -backed candidates, so the argument goes, are more likely to win un- der a district election plan, if minorities form the majority of the population in at least one district. Lawsuits already have been filed against Po- mona and Watsonville (both lost at the trial level). More will follow, as all but 18 of California's 444 cities use at -large elections. School boards and other local government units who elect officials at -large also are potential targets. Legislation has been introduced in Sacramento to require district elections in cities with significant minority populations. Unfortunately, this 60's style attack on one of California's most venerable political institutions EIe.+ owS— LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES 1400 S Street S cramento, California 95814 RETURN IN 2 WEEKS PLEASE (continued on page 6) Western CitylMarch 1987 S Get the Case advantage at these participating Case dealers CALIFORNIA Industry 91749 Case Power & Equipment Phil uon Hemert P.O. Box 1251 (818)-968-9611 Oxnard 93031 Case Power & Equipment Jim Schielke P.O. Box 5407 (805)-656-0566 Sacramento 95823 Case Power & Equipment Jule Larrabee 7849 Stockton (916)-423-1166 San Jose 95112 Case Power & Equipment Robert Buxton 1505 Industrial Ave. (408)-298-1475 Santa Maria 93455 Ryan Equipment Company Robert Ryan 2770 Santa Maria Way (805)-937-6396 Santa Rosa 95407 Hogue Equipment Co. Bill Kuhn 3939 So. Moorland Ave. (707)-584-7690 I District Elections? Con liberal reform of t e trine. a ormers (continued from page S) would be appalled at the suggestion that v nment struc- is based on a series of false assumptions. It also constitutes a regrettable misdi- rection of minority resources and energy from elective politics and community problems. Worse, it will polarize tar- geted cities and damage the political fabric of these communities for years to come, for little meaningful gain. Let us explore now some of the more common fallacies in the emerging de- bate over at -large elections. Some district advocates, like Rice University sociologist Chandler Davidson, argue that at -large elections were designed deliberately to disenfranchise minority voters. In recent decades, some Eastern and Southern cities with large black populations did utilize various electoral devices to counter growing black political participation. The California experience is entirely different. Nonpartisan, at -large elec- tions were a prominent feature of the progressive era, "good government" municipal reform movement popular around the turn of the century. This movement was a reaction to Eastern style Tammany Hall bossism and political corruption prevalent in district systems and in California to the political domi- nation of the Southern Pacific Railroad. From 1883 to 1955, general law cities in California were required by state law to elect councilmembers at -large. Reformers believed district or ward elections promote regionalism and spe- cial interest, "pork barrel" politics, be- cause each council member is answerable only to the voters in his ward. They pre- ferred at -large voting to ensure each councilmember is responsive to the city as a whole, for all councilmembers must appeal to a majority of the voters in the city, not to just one neighborhood or spe- cial interest group. Reformers had greater success in the West than in the East, where party -dom- inated district systems already were en- trenched. California and other states still were sparsely populated and many cities only then were incorporating. At -large elections, in short, were the -(John McDermott is a partner in the Las Angeles office of the Chicago -based law f rm of McDermott, Will and Emery. He represents the City of Pomona in the recent lawsuit challenging its at -large election system.) California s bas►c city go er ture for the last century was conceived in racism. Indeed, minorities had not yet arrived in California in large numbers. In the rush to adopt district systems, public officials would do well to recall the historical origins and reasons for the adoption of at -large systems. Often those who favor district elec- tions grossly oversimplify a very com- plex issue by condemning all at -large systems. Some at -large systems may dis- advantage minorities, and, if so, the law requires that they be changed. In fact, many varieties of at -large sys- tems, which incorporate diverse elec- toral features, currently exist. These are the most common at -large systems: — True at -large: For example, candi- dates run for two open seats, and the two highest vote getters are elected. All can- didates run against each other. — Numbered post: Two candidates run for one seat and two other candidates run for a second seat. There are two separate elections. — Geographic Residency: Candidates must live in the district they seek to rep- resent, but voting is citywide. This re- quirement prevents any possibility that all council members will reside in one area of town. — Hybrid: Some cities have district pri- maries with at -large general elections. Others have "mixed" systems — they elect some council members at -large, some by district. Still other electoral features — com- mon to both district and at -large systems — affect local council races. These in- clude nonpartisan elections, staggered term elections, off-year elections, ma- jority vote requirements, size of council and size of district. A recent survey of the social science literature by Davidson indicates that, overall, blacks and, to a lesser extent, Hispanics, are elected more frequently under district systems than under at - large systems. Yet that research makes no distinction among types of electoral systems, nor does it consider other elec- toral features or differences in impact on various ethnic groups. Of 34 California cities with popula- tions ranging between 75,000 and 125,000 people, political scientist Susan MacManus found that most blacks reside in cities with either at -large systems with geographic residency requirements or district systems. Blacks held 30 percent of council seats in the at -large cities, 26 (continued on page 8) March 1987IWestern City .._.,..-x -i ,`�1�ai.,autJ—•'-"�'^�gaa'�1C9ie._TewoW'�''l�www.�uv.swuie�a• -.- - 1'• I District Elections? Con (continued on page 6) percent in cities with district systems. This finding has been replicated in other research. Another political scientist, Delbert Paebel, argues that other electoral fea- tures account for minority electoral non- success, more so than the at -large char- acter of the electoral system. Ironically, most school boards elect at -large, yet minorities are overrepre- sented on those bodies relative to their population share, according to a 1978 study of the 43 largest U.S. cities. This contradiction may reflect electoral struc- ture or greater minority interest in edu- cation. It certainly doesn't reflect discrimination, and casts doubt on the conclusions to be drawn from research on city council electoral structure. District elections are no panacea either. They lead to squabbles over "packing" (concentrating a group into one district that would have the strength to win two seats, if the group were split between two districts), "cracking" (splitting a group that could win one seat so that it wins none), and gerrymandering. Electoral structure is overblown in any event. Political scientist Robert Lineberry has found no evidence that it has any impact on the real business of city government — the delivery and al- location of city services. His explana- tion is that service delivery is more a function of bureaucratic efficiency prin- cipals than councilmanic demands. According to Lineberry, increased minority representation on city councils should be seen as an end in itself, be- cause district elections will not alter city service distribution patterns materially or result in different substantive choices or important policy changes. Finally, proponents of district sys- tems argue that at -large systems ignore neighborhood concerns, yet that rarely is true, if communities are truly politi- cally cohesive. Community organiza- tion, not district elections, is what ensures consideration of neighborhood-_ input. Geographic residency require-., ments, district primaries, mixed elec- toral systems, city commissions, block groups, neighborhood watches, and other devices also can improve sensitiv- ity to neighborhood -level issues. Serving as special counsel to cities. counties, redevelopment agencies. joint powers agencies, and other public entities. General Civil, Trial and Appellate Practice in the areas of Antitrust. Bankruptcy, Business, Cable Television, Civil Rights, Conswxtion, Corporate, Eminent Domain, Employment Discrimination, Environmental, Estate Planning, Probate. Health and Hospital, Land Use, Legislation, Municipal, Public Labor Relations, Real Estate, Housing and Urban Development, Taxation and Water Rights and Energy. Proponents of district elections also claim blacks have done better in other states under district elec- tions. That is true, but only where they resided in very concentrated residential areas and form the majority of the voters in a single member district. Researcher Paebel discovered in a 1978 study that electoral structure has no impact on black council representa- tion where blacks are less than 20 per- cent or greater than 40 percent of the total population. University of Califor- nia, Irvine Political Science Professor Bernard Grofman has made a similar finding in his book, Representation and Redistricting Issues. There is no reason to believe council election outcomes will differ under district systems when mi- norities make up too small a portion of the electorate. Minority populations ex- ceeding 40 percent usually result in greater political organization, cohesive- ness and influence, independent of elec- total structure. Again, California's unique demogra- phy -will disappoint those who expect substantially different outcomes from district elections. With some excep- (continued on page 40) McDonough, Holland & Allen A Professional Corporation Attorneys at Law Public Law Section: Water and Power: Joseph E. Coomes, Jr. Martin McDonough G. Richard Brown Bruce McDonough Dennis D. O'Neil Dennis W. De Cuir David F. Beatty Stuart L Somach William L Owen Virginia A Cahill Alice A Woodyard Paul S. Simmons' T. Brent Hawkins Debra S. Margolis Cable Television 555 Capitol Mall. Suite 950 Sacramento, CA 95814 (916)444-3900 4041 MacArthur Boulevard. Suite 101 Newport Beach. CA 92660 (714)851-1180 P.O. Box 3448 Oakland, CA 94609 (415) 547-0106 INIUM March I987IWestern City Parking Innovations (continued from page 19) ipalities often found themselves "rein- venting the wheel" when solving problems, when another jurisdiction may have already developed a solution to the same problem. "Active participation in the CPPA al- lows members to share new technology in the areas of data processing, com- munications, enforcement, and parking management," continues Marshall Reeves. "Solutions to problems can be applied in more than one city at lower cost and with fewer mistakes." "One of the most important benefits of participating in CPPA is the mem- bers' increased ability to define excel- lence in parking management. CPPA members have developed standards for performance and productivity. We pro- vide a forum — a working network — for the development of camaraderie. Public parking is not a happy business. Remember —no one thanks public serv- ants for ticketing, towing, or booting their cars. CPPA members can offer each other support, share experiences, and advice." The Northern and South- ern chapters hold regional meetings on a quarterly basis and each conducts periodic seminars and workshops. A well -organized and operated park- ing management system can be a tre- mendous plus to any city. In many California cities, comprehensive park- ing management programs have turned into "win -win" programs where com- munities, businesses, and municipal treasuries all benefit. Throughout California, cities are de- veloping more creative, more efficient, and more innovative public parking pro- grams. Cities are consolidating parking functions, forming single responsibility centers. Within counties, cities and agencies are increasing revenue by join- ing together to enlist the services of pri- vate vendors who can more efficiently process and collect parking tickets. As- sociation between cities, through the CPPA, provides for sharing ideas and better ways of meeting urban parking needs. Innovations in public parking programs benefit cities in many ways — they allow for smooth flowing traffic, increased public safety, better use of available parking space — they can serve as a tremendous resource for Cal- ifornia cities. (The third annual CPPA conference will be held this April in Sacramento. For further information, contact Mark Mor- gan, Parking Division Manager, City of Sacramento, at (916) 449-5354.) ■ THIS SPACE FOR LEASE Take out some space in Western City magazine. One, three, six, nine and twelve issue leases available in a variety of sizes and shapes certain to meet your needs. Each magazine goes to the core of California's 441 most influential and prestigious city leaders, all major department heads, and council members. Advertise to California cities through the finest circulation source available. For complete advertising information call Toinette O'Bricn at (916) 444-8960. Lease today. weAern city. The exclusive magazine for the California city industry. District Elections? Con (continued from page 8) tions, blacks in California are not as concentrated as they are in heavily segregated Eastern and Southern cities. Hispanics, demographic data indicate, live everywhere. In Pomona, plaintiffs lost precisely because they were unable to prove that black or Hispanic populations were either large enough or concentrated enough to form the majority of a single member district. Several recent research studies indicate that, in more integrated cities, minorities do as well under at - large systems as with district elections. The issue is even more complicated in California. One quarter of all Hispanics are not citizens and, therefore, are not eligible to vote (National Chicano Sur- vey, 1980). Furthermore, Hispanics who do vote tend not to live where most Hispanics reside. The same is true of recent Asian immigrants. Even concen- tration is no assurance of victory, if pop- ulation and citizenship do not coincide. Actually, blacks and Hispanics fre- quently have opposing interests on this issue. Blacks commonly live in more concentrated areas than Hispanics. His- panics in most cities are widely dis- persed and will have greater political influence under an at -large system. California is becoming a majority mi- nority state. As it does, minorities may be positioned to gain more seats in city- wide voting than in district elections and may regret creating white enclave districts. In any event, shifting demography and citizenship affect election outcomes far more than electoral structure. Advocates of district elections often contend that people vote primarily along racial lines, and that candidates pre- ferred by minorities often lose in at - large elections because whites with their greater numbers consistently vote against them. But, while race obviously is a factor in elections, again the issue is far more complex than that. Whites and minorities, for example, hardly vote as monolithic blocs. In Po- mona, unsuccessful 1985 Hispanic can- didate Tomas Ursua received only 57 percent of the Hispanic vote and only 29 percent of the black vote, which went primarily to his white opponent. In fact, an exit poll conducted by the plaintiffs themselves, a majority of all minorities voted against Ursua. In Stockton re- cently, two blacks were elected in pre- dominantly white districts. (continued on page 44) park ❑ IN re /aittnoonsvn3ZI.ee s 714/8748373 925M VVM• Employ" Communication Programs • Executive Pay 3 PeAormence Programs • Job Evaluation Systems • Performance Appraaal Systems Sibson &Company, Inc. One Century Plaza / Suite 1060 i 2029 Century Park East Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone (213) 556-3277'. 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If your firm is reaching out for new clients, building a name Call today to find out how you can take your place in the invest in an annual Professional Services Directory California city officials con - for itself, or introducing new services, listing in Western City's Professional Services Directory. sult when they need help. Contact Western City's Advertising Each month, your message will go directly to the people who Manager Jean Flagg at (916) 444-8960. decide which professionals their cities will look to for spec- ialized technical, professional and management services. District Elections? Con ized voting patterns peculiar to only one Yet one election is not enough. larly true for Charter cities, where the electorate must approve Charter (continued from page 40) election. There must be a pattern of racially po- changes. California offers a unique and more larized voting over several elections. small tegies thathavebeen effective y not work in as complex situation than Southern states. Most California cities have at least two een observers of the civil rights well in California. This is not the South. large ethnic groups, often three or four.Kon movement now lament reliance litigation as the primary so- California is more diverse, more com- plex, more integrated, less racially po- These ethnic groups are not always politically cohesive. In Pomona, blacks lution to problems of discrimination and unequal political participation. It di- larized, it has a different history and the most open political system in the coun- consistently favored white over Hispanic candidates and Hispanics consistently verted too much attention and resources try with regard to registration and vot- ing. Simplistic perspectives, misleading support white over black candidates. away from elective politics and com- munity problems. rhetoric, and willy-nilly assumptions This pattern has been documented in that what was true in the South must be other cities and states as well. Hispanics are not always politically Litigation is costly, time consuming and divisive. It certainly is a poor sub- so in California are not only inaccurate and unfair, but divert attention from cohesive either. That is not surprising in stitute for more critical activities like elective politics and city solutions to view of their varied national origins and fundraising, coalition building, precinct community problems, and turn friends generational differences. organization, voter registration, absen- into adversaries. District elections offer no special tee ballot drives and voter transportation dvocates of district elections promise to minority candidates where a networks. fervently believe that at -large Avoting group lacks the voting strength itself to Divisive litigation makes these activ- determines the outcome form a majority district or does not vote ities more difficult and, to some in- of city council elections. At -large voting in a politically cohesive manner. Low minority voter registration and stances, impossible. They simply cannot be done effectively at the same time. is not irrelevant, but as we have seen, it hardly is the only factor or even the most turnout is yet another indication of the lack of minority political cohesiveness. Litigation can tear communities important, at least in California. p These factors not only can defeat minor- create wounds that take years to apart, crea heal, and destroy alternative avenues of Indeed, at -large voting is not the issue at all. It is beside the point. Debate over ity electoral expectation, but in Watson- ville they resulted in a failed legal cooperation and coalition building that Lit- it only obscures more important and challenge. In that case, the court deter- may have greater long-term benefit. igation itself can be racially polarizing. more immediate obstacles to increased minority participation and influence. mined that Hispanics were not politi- cally cohesive, because "no significant It also is inaccurate to assert that cities These include lower minority socio-eco- number of eligible Hispanics have voted should change their electoral structures nomic status and educational attain - language barriers and immigrant in the elections under consideration." Where voting is racially pblarized, it voluntarily, because, in the event the city loses a legal challenge, the city will ment, assimilation, and lower minority regis- is inaccurate to say the reasons are le- have little or no say in the electoral rem- tration and voter turnout. District elec- tions will not solve these problems. gally irrelevant. The U.S. Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles declared edies imposed by a court. On the con- trary, for reasons of federal/state comity _ Mark Twain once wrote the rumors of that the reasons are probative in regard and separation of judicial and legislative powers, courts typically defer initially his death were greatly exaggerated. The same could be said for at -large elections, to the likelihood minority candidates will be elected in the future. An incum- to cities to develop alternative electoral which are alive and well and no doubt bent or more politically skillful white systems, which, so long as they remedy will continue to serve California cities in the future as they have in the candidate or a minority candidate who minority vote dilution, can take vir- as well ■ runs a poor campaign may cause polar- tually any form. This will be particu- past. March 1987iWestern City